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The relevance and importance of research for understanding policy processes and
influencing policies has been much debated, but studies on the effectiveness
of policy theories for predicting and informing opportunities for policy change
(i.e. prospective policy analysis) are rare.
The case study presented in this paper is drawn from a policy analysis of a
contemporary process of policy debate on legalization of abortion in Indonesia,
which was in flux at the time of the research and provided a unique opportunity
for prospective analysis. Applying a combination of policy analysis theories, this
case study provides an analysis of processes, power and relationships between
actors involved in the amendment of the Health Law in Indonesia. It uses a
series of practical stakeholder mapping tools to identify power relations between
key actors and what strategic approaches should be employed to manage these
to enhance the possibility of policy change.
The findings show how the moves to legalize abortion have been supported or
constrained according to the balance of political and religious powers operating
in a macro-political context defined increasingly by a polarized Islamic-
authoritarian—Western-liberal agenda. The issue of reproductive health
constituted a battlefield where these two ideologies met and the debate on
the current health law amendment became a contest, which still continues,
for the larger future of Indonesia. The findings confirm the utility of
policy analysis theories and stakeholder mapping tools for predicting the
likelihood of policy change and informing the strategic approaches for achieving
such change. They also highlight opportunities and dilemmas in prospective
policy analysis and raise questions about whether research on policy processes
and actors can or should be used to inform, or even influence, policies in
‘real-time’.
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373KEY MESSAGES
  Application of policy analysis theories and stakeholder mapping tools accurately predicted the likelihood of change on
abortion policy in Indonesia.
  Policy analysis theories and stakeholder mapping tools are useful to inform strategic approaches for achieving such
change but academic researchers are not best placed to implement policy-change strategies.
Introduction
Policy analysis theories and tools for understanding
policy change
Theories and analysis of health policy have blossomed over the
past 15 years and continue to evolve, as the 2008 special edition
of Health Policy and Planning (volume 23, issue 5) richly
demonstrates. There are numerous theories elaborating the
complexities of the policy processes and stages from Easton’s
linear and mysterious ‘black box’ of policy making (Easton
1965) through diffusion theories (Mintrom 1997; Berry 2007)
and ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier 1999) describing more
iterative influences and process, to the contemporary consensus
that health policy is a complex series of incremental and
iterative cycles, feedback loops and influences (Lush et al. 2003;
Walt 2004; Walt et al. 2004; Buse et al. 2005). The processes and
conditions necessary to facilitate policy change have also been
explored, from getting an issue onto the political agenda (Hall
1976 in Buse et al. 2005) to understanding when a ‘window of
opportunity’ for change emerges (Kingdon 1984).
Understanding the different dimensions of ‘power’ and how it
is exercised by a broadening network of actors is widely
recognized as central to understanding policy decision-making
and therefore the potential for decision-making. Power is
widely understood as pluralist (Dahl 1961; Buse et al. 2005;
Lukes 2005), though elitist power of authoritarian regimes is
also recognized (Heywood 1999). Power can be exercised
through individual agency and/or the power of structures and
organizations (Giddens 1984). Further, the power of non-state
decision-makers, like the media, is increasingly acknowledged
(Lukes 2005), and the involvement of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups in policy processes
has become increasingly formalized (Buse and Walt 2000;
de Leeuw 2001). Related to this, theories of ‘interconnected-
ness’ (Bordieu 1983) have developed that seek to understand
the networking between different groups and individuals
towards a common goal—so called ‘policy networks’ (Marsh
1998; Walt et al. 2003) and ‘policy communities’ (Buse et al.
2005).
Attempts to map key actors, their connections and influences
in the policy process led to the development of tools that enable
us to understand the personalities and politics of a wide range
of stakeholders who are interested in or will be affected by
policy change (Blair et al. 1996 in Varvaskovsky and Brugha
2000; Reich and Cooper 2001; Roberts et al. 2004). These tools
allow us to map out the stakeholders (policy actors) according
to their relative power, influence and networks, and determine
how to strategically manage them in order to play up or ward
off their influence around a particular policy issue. Such tools
represent a step from theoretical analysis towards the develop-
ment of operational steps to proactively pursue policy change.
As such, they are used not only by academics, but also by NGOs
and interest or lobby groups. Challenges abound, however, in
attempting this step from analysis to action and there is little
in the published literature on this, though its dearth has
been noted (Buse 2008). Some theoretical work exists on the
challenges facing reformers, who tend, by definition, not to be
favoured by the status quo and its institutions (Swank 2002;
Oliver 2006). Most case-study applications of policy analysis
have been historical (for example, Trostle et al. 1999; Shretta
et al. 2001); few discuss actual strategies used by actors to
leverage their position (Gonzalez-Rosetti and Bossert 2000,
analysing South American countries, is an exception), and the
few contemporary analyses that exist seek to understand the
power and influence that explains contemporary decisions and
positions, but do not seek to analyse how a change could be
made (e.g. Schneider 2002).
In recognition of these gaps, this paper describes an
Indonesian study that was undertaken to explore the driving
forces behind a contemporary process of policy debate on
legalization of abortion in Indonesia, to analyse the positions
of key stakeholder groups, to assess the extent to which a
window of opportunity was available for policy change and to
identify what strategic approaches would be necessary to
achieve a policy change. As with many academic studies,
there was no funding to develop and implement strategies
suggested by the identified approaches. Nevertheless, subse-
quent events allowed us to test the predictive power of the
agenda-setting and stakeholder-mapping tools. Based on the
findings—and limitations—of this study, therefore, the paper
reflects on the utility and challenges of using policy analysis to
predict and to influence contemporary health policy processes.
Indonesia was chosen as a case study for testing these policy
theories because, at the time of the research, the debate on
legalization of abortion was beginning to be taken up in public
by a wider range of actors than previously. It represented a
unique opportunity to analyse the power and policy positions of
stakeholders in a policy debate that was unfolding.
Abortion legislation in Indonesia
A diversity of legal traditions which exist in parallel in
Indonesia leads to ambiguity in the legal status of abortion
(Bowen 2003; Burns 2004). Both Criminal Law [Kitab
Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) Articles 346–349]
(Republic of Indonesia, undated), modelled on the Dutch
colonial government, and Shari’a Law forbid abortion, but
under the Health Law (Law 23/1992, Article 15) it is permitted
to save the woman’s life. In addition, some clinics will provide
abortions in the case of contraceptive failure because it is then
deemed to be a health service failure and not the fault of the
woman who had taken reasonable steps to prevent unwanted
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husbands and prove that they are married (Republic of
Indonesia 1992; Bedner 2001). An explanatory note to the
law specifies that the health worker must be a qualified
obstetrician/gynaecologist.
The punishment for illegal abortion is also inconsistent across
the different laws. The Health Law states that punishment
for abortion is 15 years’ of imprisonment, with a fine of
500 million rupiah (about £28000) (Article 8) (Republic of
Indonesia 1992). Indictments under this clause of the Health
Law are based on the Criminal Code (KUHP), but this states
that the punishment for illegal abortion is 5.5 years’ imprison-
ment for the perpetrator (Article 348) and 4 years’ for a woman
inducing her own abortion (Article 346) (Republic of Indonesia,
undated). Furthermore, the 2004 Medical Practice Law provides
for a maximum sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment (Republic of
Indonesia 2004a). In the 1970s, an ‘understanding’ was reached
by medical professionals, on the advice of the Chief Justice of
the High Court, that abortions could be performed to preserve a
woman’s life or health (Utomo et al. 1982; Hull et al. 1993).
Since the early 1970s, there have been continuous attempts in
Indonesia to reform the abortion law. The most recent debates
have drawn in political, religious and social groups.
The views of abortion according to different strands of Islam
and Islamic law are complex and often exacerbated by wider
political concerns (Bowen et al. 1997). There are two main sects
within Islam: the Shiite/Shia and the Sunni. The Shiites have
historically deemed abortion illegal after implantation except to
save the mother’s life, but important changes have emerged
over the past two decades. Although in general abortion is
discouraged, there are now many examples—most recently
from Iran—where religious rulings and legislation have
permitted abortions for a broader range of conditions including
serious foetal abnormalities and serious social or economic
hardship at various stages during the pregnancy (Hedayat et al.
2006).
Indonesia is a majority Sunni population who adhere to the
teachings of elected Islamic scholars. There are four schools of
thought in Sunni Islam and the Shafi’I school is prominent in
Indonesia (and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Southern Arabia
and parts of East Africa). This school holds that abortions may
be permitted, if for good reason, up to 120 days of pregnancy
when ‘ensoulment’ is deemed to occur (Bowen 1997; Maguire
2001; Outka and Brockopp 2002; Aksoy 2005). Nevertheless,
since none of the schools acknowledge a hierarchical clergy,
there are considerable variations in beliefs and practices within
one school. In Indonesia the leadership is divided into three
principal sources: (1) the religious leaders (ulama or kyai) who
work for the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other govern-
ment departments; (2) the independent religious leaders and
scholars who have individual followers; and (3) the major
Islamic organizations. Three organizations have a significant
role in influencing and changing attitudes towards policy: the
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Religious Leaders
Council), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah.
MUI is a consultative body to the government working closely
with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, issuing fatwas on social
issues, including abortion, and representing several Muslim
organizations including the NU and Muhammadiyah (Kaptein
2004). In 1983 and 1992 the MUI declared that abortion was
absolutely prohibited (haram). Nonetheless, the Muslim com-
munity is divided on this issue. The NU is the largest Muslim
organization in Indonesia (about 40 million members, mostly
rural), and often progressive including on reproductive health
issues. Some of its leaders condone abortion, albeit reluctantly,
as ‘just cause’ when pregnancy endangers a woman’s health,
while others accept abortion as long as it occurs before
ensoulment, i.e. before 120 days of pregnancy (Sciortino et al.
1996; Candland and Nurjanah 2004). NU has recommended
that abortions be conducted in emergency situations when the
pregnancy endangers a mother’s life, and that it be considered
for cases of rape and incest—a view supported by NU’s
Women’s Organization and by a number of scholars from
Islamic universities who argue that unwanted pregnancies
endanger the lives of mothers (Baramuli 2004). The
Muhammadiyah is the most conservative of the main organ-
izations; an independent modernist organization, it aims to
restore the purity of Islamic teaching. Although its membership
is quite small, it is highly influential because of its national
network of schools and hospitals and its access to mass media.
It opposes abortion on the grounds that it destroys valued life
(Dzuhayatin 2006).
The ambiguity of the legality of abortion (judicial and
religious), and the severity of punishment, leads to widespread
confusion and reluctance among medical practitioners to
perform abortions. Study data indicate that ambiguity also
leads to an inconsistent application of the law, corruption and
extortion. Consequently there are high levels of clandestine
abortions resulting in a maternal mortality rate that is the
highest in the sub-region: 334 deaths per 100000 women
compared with 10/100000 in Singapore, 60/100000 in
Philippines and 50/100000 in Thailand (Ministry of Health
and World Health Organization 2003; UNDP 2007).
Aims, concepts and methods
The aim of this study was two-fold:
(1) To document the relative power and influence of the key
actors in order to understand the context in which
abortion policy decisions are made;
(2) To apply known policy analysis frameworks to test their
usefulness for predicting the future direction of an
abortion policy in a political climate currently in flux.
We employed a policy analysis approach drawing on concepts
from two models. First, Kingdon’s concept of a convergence of
three ‘streams’ (problem recognition, development and diffu-
sion of policy alternatives, and political context) to achieve a
‘window of opportunity’ for a change in policy. In the Indonesian
context we considered both immediate-historical and contem-
porary contexts relevant to the Health Reform Bill. Problem
recognition explored how much consensus there was that the
high levels of maternal mortality, including from unsafe
abortion, was a problem, and how it was framed (as a health
and/or rights issue). The political will affecting the development
and diffusion of differing solutions required more analysis since
a range of possible responses emerged. Second, Walt and
Gilson’s framework investigating actors, processes and contexts
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three streams (Walt 1994; Walt and Gilson 1994; Kingdon
1995). We also used stakeholder analysis frameworks and
tools to analyse the power, networking and political will of key
actors in order to clearly recognize both the promoters and
detractors in the political stream (Majchrzak 1984; Brugha and
Varvasovsky 2000).
A total of 158 in-depth key informant interviews with
98 respondents were conducted in ‘Bahasa Indonesia’ by CS
between August 2004 and January 2006. Respondents were
selected through purposive and snowball sampling. Interviews
with about half of respondents were tape-recorded; where
permission was not given, extensive notes were taken which
were verified with the respondent. All interviews were then
transcribed and analysed in Bahasa Indonesia; they were only
translated into English for inclusion in the written analysis.
The range of respondents is shown in Table 1. In addition to a
wide spectrum of key informants, media and document analysis
and participant observation at political events were conducted
through the study period. A personal reflective diary checked
personal bias in conducting interviews and the stakeholder
analysis. The data were analysed qualitatively and key emerging
themes were consolidated in a code frame that was checked
and refined through application.
In addition to receiving information from key stakeholders,
a system of triangulation was used to establish the validity
of information. This process involved cross-checking informa-
tion from one or more sources, either through interviews
or official documents, to validate a statement made by a
respondent. Therefore, most information here was obtained
from two or more sources. In instances where information
conflicted, further enquiry was made through additional
interviews and document analysis to clarify the issue. In
addition, a respondent validation was conducted to confirm the
interpretive validity of the findings. More than half of the
interviewees were shown a summary of the analysis and asked
to give feedback on a one-on-one basis.
Context and process: analysis of the
passage of the Health Reform Bill
The contextual and process analysis was based on analysis of
documents, literature review and key informant interviews.
Historical analysis; the first health Bill: abortion
as a health and rights issue
The first legal concession to abortion appeared in the 1999
ratification of the International Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
by President B J Habibie (Law 39/1999, Republic of Indonesia
1999). The new national law described abortion to save a
mother’s life and a court decision to pass the death sentence as
the only two permissible exceptions to the right to life. It was
only after President Megawati was inaugurated in 2001 that
abortion began to be taken up as a health, rather than a
criminal, issue. When President Megawati came to power in
July 2001 there were high hopes among women’s rights
advocates and she certainly gave more attention to women’s
issues, including tabling the first bill to amend the Health Law.
The draft health bill allowed that ‘Qualified, safe, and respon-
sible pregnancy cessation should be performed based on the
emergency situation justified by authorized health personnel’
(Chapter IX, article 63, section 3). It was presented as part of
a much wider Bill on Health including maternal health, with
the maternal mortality rate (MMR) widely acknowledged
as unacceptably high. Views differed, however, on the extent
to which abortion contributed to the MMR, with estimates
ranging from 11% (Department of Health 1995) to 50%
(Director General of Community Health in the Jakarta Post
2000). Consequently, views differed on the solutions to the high
MMR, with many preferring improvements to antenatal care
and delivery care, education and increased family planning,
over legalization of safe abortion services.
During President Megawati’s term, wide consultation was
held on the draft Bill encompassing NGOs, religious and
professional organizations as well as government institutions.
The Health Commission presented the final draft, with aca-
demic supporting papers, to Parliament, who, after a period of
internal discussion, backed it and proposed the Bill to
Government to secure a Presidential Decree to pass it into law.
In parallel, however, President Megawati had to manage
powerful opponents. Although her party had majority seats in
the parliament, it was not enough to provide a strong,
unconditional support and she therefore had to form a coalition
cabinet (Mydans 2001). Recognizing the constraints of this
arrangement, President Megawati embarked on constitu-
tional reform to increase Presidential powers and restructure
Parliament. This included endorsing a new regulation reforming
the processes necessary to make and to amend bills (Law
30/2004, Republic of Indonesia 2004b). President Megawati’s
Table 1 Interviews conducted, by respondent type
Interviewees No.
Executives: presidential staff and cabinet members 3
Legislatives (Parliament Members who are members
of Commissions)
26
Indonesia Forum of Parliamentarians on Population
& Development (IFPPD)
4
Politicians from liberal parties (PDIP, Demokrat,
Golkar, PKB)
17
Politicians from conservative parties (PAN, PPP, PKS) 9
Ministry of Health and bureaucrats 4
National Family Planning Coordination Board 3
Progressive religious groups 5
Hard-line religious groups 3
Health and women’s NGOs 16
Professional medical bodies 18
Law enforcement/judicial 4
Media/journalists 3
Academics 7
Other key informants (donors, community groups,
medical practitioners, influential individuals in
public life etc.)
36
TOTAL 158
376 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGterm as president came to an end in 2004 before the Health Bill
gained its presidential decree. She was not re-elected and the
regulation that changed the Bill-making procedures was to stall
the progress of the Health Bill under her successor.
Contemporary analysis; the second Bill’s passage:
abortion becomes an ideological battleground
In 2004, when the fieldwork for this study began, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired military general, had become
the first president to be elected directly by voters. He won a
large majority on the platform of a secular state with an
international and commercial relations stance. His election, the
sound defeat of the Islamic parties and his appointment of four
women to his cabinet, one of whom became the Minister for
Health, once again brought hopes for women’s rights. Despite a
strengthened role of the President vis a `vis parliament following
constitutional reform, Yudhoyono was from a small party and
therefore still potentially vulnerable to negative reactions in
Parliament. Therefore he too sought to satisfy the different
political interests by forming a large coalition cabinet, including
many hard-line religious parties in opposition to his own
(Zenzie 1999; Effendy 2004; President of Indonesia 2004).
To make things worse his presidency had to cope with a series
of national disasters which seriously detracted from his reform
agenda, including the devastating tsunami affecting Aceh
(December 2004), suicide bombers in Bali (September 2002
and October 2005) and a series of natural and man-induced
disasters in Java throughout 2005–06. Events on the macro-
political stage further exacerbated the religious, political and
ethnic divides in an already fractious political and social fabric.
The fall-out from the events of 9/11 were huge and ongoing:
the war on terror, further bombings in Bali and London, the
war in Iraq, the publication in a Danish newspaper of a series
of cartoons about Mohammed, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
and more. All these events served to escalate tensions in
Indonesia between Muslims in Indonesia and the West, as
manifest in extensive polarized newspaper coverage at the time
that was examined as part of the media/document review for
the study. So, when by mid-2005 the Health Bill amendment
was back in Parliament, it was coloured by the increasingly
polarized macro-political climate:
‘‘This is Western propaganda covered in humanitarian aid.
One of the proofs is that ICPD provides US$15 million to fund
reproductive health and reproductive rights campaigns. Do they give
this for free? Is this a real humanitarian act?...this is nothing but
Western trick to promulgate their secular concept of freedom.’’
(Member of Religious Group, Interviewee #45)
‘‘By using the word ‘safe abortion’ instead of ‘legal abortion’ the
Westerners poison our society with their secular ideas. Solving our
problems the Western way means separating religion from life.’’
(Member of Religious Group, Interviewee #40)
The amendment of the Health Law to liberalize abortion was
thus portrayed as an encroachment of Western ideology
incompatible with Islamic values; a critical battlefield in the
ideological war for the destiny of Indonesia, with Parliament
apparently reluctant to act in the face of religious opposition:
‘‘If [Parliamentarians] are really serious in their effort to strive for
women’s reproductive rights, the legislative can use its authority to
push the government to take further action about the health bill.’’
(NGO member, Interviewee #59)
As a direct counter to the Health Bill, an Anti-Pornography
Bill was proposed in February 2006 which sought to impose
mandatory clothing restrictions on women, curfews on their
movement and criminalize their sexual liberties. It was listed,
together with the Health Bill, in the National Legislation
Programme for 2005–09 (Department of Laws and Human
Rights 2008), provoking fierce debate and mass demonstrations
from a whole cross-section of Indonesian society concerned by
the Bill’s perceived clamp down on women’s rights. Proponents
of the Anti-Pornography Bill claim ‘...this draft law is being
deliberated because we are trying to protect women and
children, not to criminalize them...’ (Amidhan, leader of
Religious Leaders Council (MUI) and member of National
Commission on Human Rights, cited in Jakarta Post, March
2006). Its opponents, who favour the Health Bill, accused the
Anti-Pornography Bill of discriminating against Indonesia’s
diverse cultures and traditions tantamount to an act of treason
against the state ideology Pancasila (an embodiment of the
principles of an independent Indonesian state formulated by
Sukarno in 1945) and the 1945 constitution which protects the
country’s many cultures (Effendy 2004; Gillespie 2007).
Analysis of power and linkage of
key actors and use of stakeholder
mapping tools
It is against the preceding contextual backdrop that the study
sought to analyse the power and linkage of key actors, map
their positions (both in terms of how they framed the problem
and their views on the solutions), determine whether a window
of opportunity existed for change and inform strategic
approaches to achieve this.
Presidents Megawati and Yudhoyono had both come to power
on a similar secular, pro-reform platform, but both needed to
appoint inclusive cabinets to ensure broad parliamentary
support, and this meant that the powerful religious parties
in Parliament were able to wield increasing influence.
Furthermore, macro-political events heightened the tension
between ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ values, increasing the political
bargaining power of the religious anti-reformist factions in
Parliament and appearing to give them an upper hand.
Since President Soeharto’s regime (1965–98), Indonesia has
maintained a secular state distancing Islam from politics,
though there are a number of powerful Islamic parties in
Parliament. There are seven major parties in Indonesia, which
can be roughly divided according to their predominant ideol-
ogy: secular or Islam. In an Indonesian context ‘liberal’
represents a pluralist, egalitarian and non-sectarian outlook,
while ‘conservative’ represents a more sectarian, explicitly
pro-Muslim ideology actively engaged in proselytising, as the
basis for state action (Zenzie 1999). The religious outlooks of
the seven major political parties on this spectrum are shown
in Figure 1.
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It is perhaps no surprise that the parties’ religious outlook
approximated to their official views on the abortion ‘problem’.
The more liberal political parties can be generally described as
pro-reformist. The PDI-P (led by former President Megawati)
talked of the amendment in a rational, secular way:
‘‘This amendment will accommodate protection of reproductive
rights and reproductive health, including safe termination of
pregnancy which has been profoundly discussed and debated. The
objective is to have a solid policy ground on the national and local
level. Reproductive health needs to be integrated in the health
services, especially in health centres.’’ (PDI-P Representative and
member of Health Commission IX, Interviewee #12)
The position of the Democratic Party (Demokrat) is similar,
though they were careful to explain that the amendment was
about regulating unsafe abortion to minimize maternal deaths,
not to liberalize abortion:
‘‘The high MMR is attributed to unsafe pregnancy termination due
to lack of information and access to health care services. Abortion
is not only the responsibility of medical professionals. Data shows
that most abortions were performed by unskilled persons such as
midwives and dukun (traditional healers). This is the reason why
we have such a high number of unsafe abortions. This is what we
want to regulate in the health bill. Thus this health bill is not
created to liberalize abortion.’’ (Democratic Party Representa-
tive and member Women’s Empowerment Commission
VIII, Interviewee #22)
The moderate parliamentary groups enjoyed an advantage in
weight of numbers in parliament and its commissions. Table 2
indicates the numbers from each of the seven main parties on
the three key health-related commissions.
These numbers alone boded well for passage of the amend-
ment. In addition, pro-reformist women/health NGOs, pro-
fessional bodies, progressive religious groups and academia
have coalesced, led by the Women’s Health Foundation (YKP).
Analysis of key stakeholders and interviews with them revealed
that the political influence of YKP is high because of its
connections, through blood and marriage ties, with high-level
individuals at the Supreme Court, police force, the Attorney
General, and the House of Representatives. Pro-reformists have
worked both formally and informally to promote the Health
Bill by using personal networks and links, and fostering
collaboration with the media.
Despite the fact that the reform Bill had behind it a
well-connected organization like YKP, and through it influen-
tial elite politicians, as well as the support of the liberal
political parties in Parliament, the outcome of the Bill’s passage
was not guaranteed since the anti-reform lobby was vocal
and proactive.
Anti-reformists
The anti-reformist, religiously conservative parties expressed
strong opposition of the amendment on the grounds that it
actively legalized abortion which they oppose on religious and
moral grounds:
‘‘This is nothing but a cowardly euphemism—hiding behind subtle
words such as ‘to save a woman from unsafe abortion’. This bill
is clearly advocating abortion.’’ (PKS Representative, Health
Commission IX, Interviewee #26)
‘‘There are articles in the health bill which give a chance for people
to abort and reproduce without considering religious aspects and
society ethics....these articles may precipitate free sex. It is okay to
reproduce but marital status should be the requirement.’’ (Media
reference: PPP Representative, quoted Suara Merdeka, 14
th
September 2005)
Being politically, legally and socially powerful, and with direct
influence on policy makers, it was the religious leaders who
held a pivotal role in the abortion policy debate. The MUI is
the highest Islamic consultative body to the government. Its
membership includes prominent religious leaders as well as
government officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
representatives of Muslim organizations. When MUI issues a
fatwa (religious order), the majority of Indonesian Muslims
tend to follow it. The MUI has repeatedly declared abortion
haram (forbidden) except to save the mothers’ life and in 2000
issued a fatwa to this effect (Masyhuri 2002). As noted earlier,
the hostile macro-political climate has also been exploited by
the religious-political opposition, who have mobilized popular
media against the Bill and held up the abortion clause as
evidence of corrupting Western influences.
Changing balance of power
In November 2006, after consultations with medical experts
and progressive religious groups during discussions on the
present Health Bill, MUI released a fatwa that abortion is
allowed in pregnancies in the case of rape as long as the
pregnancy is less than 40 days. With this fatwa MUI issued an
explanation to society that abortion can be performed and be
considered legitimate provided there is adherence to certain
conditions and religious requisites. This began to open the door
to reform with one of Indonesia’s most influential religious
advisory groups.
At the end of 2006 when the interviews were completed, the
pro- and anti-reformists appeared closely matched, each facing
a tough fight to prevail. Victory hinged upon the decisions of
the strategies in each camp. Having identified the key pro- and
anti-reformists, a stakeholder mapping exercise was then
undertaken to identify key approaches to prospectively mana-
ging these factions.
PDI-P Demokrat Golkar PKB PAN PPP PKS
 Liberal Conservative
Figure 1 Religious perspectives of Indonesia’s seven major political parties
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As noted in the methods section, the study findings (narrative
and stakeholder mapping) were verified with more than half of
respondents. The stakeholder mapping that was conducted
therefore represents a triangulated interpretation of the relative
power and influence of key stakeholders. The two tables below
summarize findings on how actors viewed the abortion problem
(Table 3), whether they supported legislation (the Health Bill
and its abortion clause) as the solution and their relative
influence and power (Table 4).
Table 3 indicates that most key actors recognize that
widespread unsafe abortion is a serious problem. Most see
abortion purely as a health problem which means they often
expect it to have a health service solution (an expanded family
planning programme was seen by many as the answer to the
problem). Fewer, though still a surprisingly large number,
see the issue as both a health and a human rights one,
and therefore give more weight to the proposed legislation as a
probable solution.
If Table 4 is compared with Table 3 a number of correlations
are evident. Actors who regard abortion as a human rights issue
are, in general, in favour of the legislative amendment
liberalizing access to abortion. The three groups who see
abortion primarily as a health issue are ambivalent or opposed
to the abortion clause, though largely supportive of the Bill
itself. In fact no group opposes the Bill itself, though some are
neutral, and only three groups are actively opposed to abortion.
Nevertheless, as the previous analysis of the anti-reformists
has also shown, these are powerful groups: vocal, hard-line
religious leaders, the media and conservative parties in
Parliament.
Following our mapping of stakeholders, analysis of the
key-informant interviews and assessment of each actor’s
perspectives on the problem and solutions and their relative
power and influence, we placed the stakeholders on an ‘optimal
fit model’ which determined how much and what kind of
attention should be paid to stakeholders (Blair et al. 1996,
adapted by Varvasovsky and Brugha 2000). This is shown in
Figure 2 from the perspective of wanting to support the Health
Bill. For example, pro-Bill campaigners could galvanize support
through actively involving progressive religious groups, individ-
ual politicians concerned about women’s health and individual
lawyers who are supportive of the Bill. Ministries with a mixed
position on the Health Bill represent opportunities for collab-
oration; for example, discussions on the benefits of the Bill
compared with other options. Those groups with a non-
supportive position towards the Bill—such as hard-line reli-
gious groups—need to be defended against, in other words
opposed, by campaigners for the Bill, to expose their differences
and prejudices; any attempt at collaboration or more active
involvement with these groups represents a risk. Finally, those
who are marginal in the debate on the Bill (including various
influential public figures and role models) should be monitored,
and if they start to express a strong opinion for or against the
Bill, they would then be either defended against or drawn into
campaign collaboration or involvement.
A window of opportunity? What happened next?
Our application of the policy and stakeholder analysis tools
suggested that a window of opportunity to pass the Bill did
exist. Careful work of pro-reformists with the MUI and
progressive religious groups, together with consolidating the
support of the popular media, had the potential to turn public
and Parliamentary opinion in the Bill’s favour—providing that
the spectrum of actors and their delicate balance could be
effectively managed, and in particular that the influence of
hard-line religious leaders could be curbed.
The time-limited academic analysis ended here; the practical
development and application of strategies should then have
begun, but as with too many research projects there was no
funding available to properly follow-up on the findings of the
stakeholder analysis and the strategic approaches resulting
from this study. The findings were presented to several
international and national conferences and meetings on repro-
ductive rights and abortion. In addition CS met many members
of activist groups to share findings and discuss strategic
approaches. In general, though, the academic researchers were
not privy to the politicking and negotiations occurring between
the pro-reformist groups, and could not work with the
reformists for the further 3 years it took before the Health
Bill was finally passed.
After ongoing media and professional spars between the
pro- and anti-reformists, the anti-reformists seemed to take
the upper hand in late 2008 when parliament approved the
Table 2 Party representatives in the abortion-relevant Commissions, Parliament 2005–09
Political parties
Commissions
VIII (Women’s empowerment) IX (Health) X (Education, youth)
Golkar 11 11 12
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDIP) 10 9 9
National Awakening Party (PKB) 5 4 4
United Development Party (PPP) 5 5 5
Democratic Party 4 5 5
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 4 4 4
National Mandate Party (PAN) 3 4 5
Other small parties 3 2 3
Total members 45 44 47
CAN POLICY THEORIES PREDICT & INFORM POLICY CHANGE? 379Anti-Pornography Bill which became law on 30 October 2008.
Eight factions in the parliament approved, two walked out and
two individuals from Golkar party (one of the eight factions
who approved) also walked out, and widespread demonstra-
tions took place. The passing of this opposing bill, however,
appeared to rekindle efforts by the reformists to step-up and
co-ordinate their networking and lobbying, and on Monday,
14 September 2009, the Health Bill was approved by the
legislative body and passed into Law (enacted on 13 October
2009). The reproductive health (including abortion) component
appears under articles 71–77 while the penalty component
appears under article 194. The Bill approved still bears a lot of
controversial, discriminative articles towards women and re-
tains some ambiguity. For example, article 75 (2a) and (2b)
Table 3 Stakeholders’ views and priority on abortion issue
Key actors Views on abortion Priority on issue
Executives Do not acknowledge abortion as a
pressing health problem
Low
Legislatives Health and human rights issue High
IFPPD Health and human rights issue High
Moderate political parties Health and human rights issue High
Conservative political parties Health issue Moderate
Ministry of Health and bureaucrats Health issue Moderate
National Family Planning
Coordination Board (BKKBN)
Health issue Moderate
Religious groups Recognize abortion as a problem,
but oppose the practice based
on moral and religious reasons
On and off – depend on
situation; no lobbying,
act when needed
Health and women NGOs Health and human rights issue High
Professional bodies Health issue and human rights issue High
Private practices Health issue and human rights issue High
Law enforcement/Judicative Recognize that the law is ambiguous Moderate
Media Health issue and human rights issue On and off – depend on situation
Academia Health and human rights issue Moderate
Others Span spectrum Span spectrum
IFPPD¼Indonesia Forum of Parliamentarians on Population & Development.
Table 4 Key actors’ standpoints and influence/power
Key actors
Current position on proposed solution
Influence/power Health Bill in general Abortion issues specifically
Executives Neutral Ambivalent þ/þþþ
Legislatives Strongly supportive Modestly supportive þþ/þþ
IFPPD Strongly supportive Strongly supportive þþ/þ
Liberal political parties Supportive Spans spectrum þþ/þþ
Conservative political parties Modestly supportive Oppose þþ/þþ
Ministry of Health and bureaucrats Supportive Ambivalent þ/þþ
Family Planning Coordination Board Modestly supportive Ambivalent þ/ 
Hard-line religious groups Neutral Strongly oppose þþþ/þ
Progressive religious groups Strongly supportive Strongly supportive þþþ/þ
Health and women NGOs Strongly supportive Strongly supportive þþþ/ 
Professional bodies Strongly supportive Predominantly supportive þ/ 
Private practices Strongly supportive Predominantly supportive  / 
Law enforcement/judicative Modestly supportive Modestly supportive  / 
Media Neutral Opportunistically opposed þþþ/ 
Academia Supportive Modestly supportive  / 
Others Supportive Spans spectrum þ/ 
IFPPD¼Indonesia Forum of Parliamentarians on Population & Development.
380 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGmentions that abortions are permitted only under medical
emergency detected in early pregnancy and in rape cases,
indicating that medical emergency and rape will be governed in
a separate government regulation 75(3). Article 76 outlines the
conditions under which an abortion is permissible and indicates
it can take place for any reasons up to six weeks after the first
day of last menstruation except under medical emergency, and
shall be under consent of the woman and her husband, except
in a rape case. Article 77 stated that the government shall
protect and prevent women from having non-qualified, unsafe
and irresponsible abortion, and also abortions which oppose
religious norms and laws/regulations provisions. Article 194
stated that performing abortion not under circumstances as laid
down in article 75 (2a) and (2b) is criminalized with a
maximum penalty of 10 years prison and 1 billion rupiah. YKP
(the women’s foundation) and its coalitions plan to go to
Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court) to review the
controversial and discriminative articles before the law can be
implemented through government regulations.
Conclusions and reflections on the
use and utility of policy and
stakeholder tools
Clearly, the debate about incorporating reproductive rights,
including abortion, into the health bill in Indonesia became
a religion- and culture-driven debate and not simply a data-
Figure 2 Strategies for managing stakeholders to support the Health Bill
CAN POLICY THEORIES PREDICT & INFORM POLICY CHANGE? 381driven public health or rights debate. Continuing political debts
have played an important role in the policy development of
successive presidents and allowed religious parties to wield
considerable influence. Our findings show how the moves to
legalize abortion have been supported or constrained according
to the balance of political and religious powers operating in
a macro-political context increasingly defined by a polarized
Islamic-authoritarian—Western-liberal agenda. Pro-abortion
forces advocated a larger democratic and libertarian agenda
for a profound break from the authoritarian past, whereas
those opposed to abortion aligned their strategy to a religious
authoritarian agenda. The issue of reproductive health therefore
constituted a battlefield where these two ideologies met and the
debate on the current health law amendment became a contest,
which still continues, for the larger future of Indonesia.
In a setting where a substantive policy issue is debated as a
function of political debt and credit, compounded by religious
and moral pronouncements, a number of challenges are thrown
down for researchers engaged in prospective policy analysis, in
particular: in such settings what is the purpose of academic
policy analysis; should academics be engaging in prospective
analysis that overtly seeks to change policy; if so, how can they
do it effectively?
What is the point of academic policy
analysis?
A rigorous, academic analysis of complex policy processes and
the comparison of situations and contexts are important for
two reasons. First, in order for anyone to influence the policy
process, and the resulting decisions, we need to understand it.
Academic analysis allows a refinement of research frameworks
and tools, over long years of application in multiple contexts,
which deepens our understanding of policy processes and
where and how interventions can most effectively be made. In
practice, there are few published case studies applying political
analysis theories in ‘real time’, that would allow constructive
reflection on existing theories and tools. Our study confirmed
the usefulness of a combined theoretical approach. The
Walt–Gilson framework for analysing policy process, context
and actors informed the assessment needed to apply the
Kingdon model of convergence of three streams to assess
the likelihood of policy change. Our findings confirmed
the predictive ability of this model. Second, lessons can be
learned across contexts and issues. For example, our findings
regarding the critical role the YKP women’s foundation played
in connecting the political actors, religious leaders and influ-
ential media is important and has resonance for many other
settings.
Should academics engage in prospective analysis
and if so, how?
A particular challenge faces prospective policy researchers
rather than, for example, academics involved in research on a
specific medical or health issue which can be presented as
‘evidence’ to influence a policy. Policy research that seeks to
understand the political process itself in order to influence it
may therefore be seen as overtly attempting to challenge the
status quo, an aim not readily accepted by powerful policy
decision-makers.
In our Indonesia case, the study identifies approaches for
managing stakeholders toward a consensus and alignment of
positions. These indicate with whom (e.g. progressive religious
groups) a particular approach (e.g. involvement in pro-change
discussions) should be used. Such knowledge may enable key
policy advocates to develop strategies for action to effectively
use potential windows of opportunity in the policy-making
process. To be truly effective, however, the advocates them-
selves need to be involved in the development of strategies.
To secure their engagement, academics need to be linked into
the advocate/activist scene. This blurring of academic–advocacy
boundaries may, in turn, raise questions of impartiality.
If academics actively engage with stakeholders (either by
working with them to identify strategies or ‘handing-on’ their
findings to act on) do they jeopardize academia’s role as an
‘impartial’ researcher, which is what may provide them
with credibility in the first place? Buse (2008) argues
that there may in fact be an ethical argument that policy
researchers and others should be involved in actively changing
policy if this upholds internationally agreed goals such as the
Millennium Development Goals. This might be a more accept-
able role for ‘think-tank’ researchers rather than academic
researchers.
The findings from this study suggest that policy analysis
theories and stakeholder mapping tools can be applied to
predict the likelihood of policy change and inform the strategic
approaches for achieving such change. The jury is still out on
whether researchers engaged in such research can—or should
themselves—make the step from analysis to action and the
partiality that this would inevitably be seen to entail.
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